Imminent Danger, Iran, and the Limits of Waiting

“There are moments in geopolitics when ‘wait and see’ stops being prudence and starts becoming negligence.” – Dr. Daniel Marte

A Fair Analysis of Anticipatory Self-Defense in the Israel-United States Context

There are moments in international affairs when delay is not prudence, but vulnerability. The doctrine of imminent danger exists precisely for those moments. It was never designed to justify adventurism, nor to provide moral cover for preventive war. It was designed to address the hard case: when a threat has matured to such a degree that waiting to absorb the blow would be strategically reckless and legally absurd.

That is why the case of Iran, Israel, and the United States deserves thoughtful analysis rather than slogans. The issue is not whether Iran has hostile rhetoric. It does. The issue is whether the combination of declared intent, proxy warfare, direct missile attacks, and nuclear opacity creates a case that rises above generalized hostility and enters the realm of imminent danger. A fair answer requires discipline, definitions, evidence, and honesty about both the strength and the limits of the doctrine.[1]

The Starting Point: What “Imminent Danger” Really Means

In ordinary conversation, imminent danger means something is about to happen. In international law and strategic doctrine, however, the phrase carries a much heavier burden. It refers to a threat that is concrete, immediate, and operationally serious enough that the state under threat no longer has realistic time or peaceful alternatives to protect itself.

The classic formulation comes from the Caroline standard, which described lawful necessity as “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” [2] That language remains influential because it sets a high threshold. Not every danger is imminent. Not every enemy is an imminent threat. Not every unstable regime may be struck preemptively simply because it could become more dangerous later.

This is where the distinction becomes essential. Preemptive self-defense addresses a threat that is operationally impending. Preventive war addresses a threat that may become dangerous in the future. One is narrow and arguable. The other is broad and legally suspect.[3]

That distinction must govern any serious discussion of Iran.

The Legal Framework: The U.N. Charter and the Debate It Did Not End

The legal baseline begins with the United Nations Charter. Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, while Article 51 preserves the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs.” [4]

This is where the debate begins, not where it ends.

A narrow reading of Article 51 says self-defense becomes lawful only after an armed attack has occurred. A broader reading, grounded in customary international law and state practice, argues that the Charter did not erase the longstanding principle that a state need not sit motionless while an attack is clearly taking shape.[5]

That is why the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense has never disappeared from serious legal discourse. The law recognizes restraint, but it cannot be interpreted in a way that rewards passivity in the face of a maturing and operational threat. At the same time, that doctrine must remain tightly confined, because once “imminence” is stretched beyond recognition, it ceases to be a legal threshold and becomes a political excuse.[6]

Iran Is Not Just Another Rival State

Any fair analysis must begin by acknowledging that Iran is not being discussed here as a mere competitor in a normal interstate dispute. The Islamic Republic has long embedded ideological hostility toward Israel and opposition to American regional influence into its governing posture. Its constitutional order reflects a transnational revolutionary outlook, and its foreign policy has repeatedly expressed itself through direct and indirect confrontation.[7]

That does not mean ideology alone justifies force. It does not. A constitution, a slogan, or a hostile sermon is not a missile launch.

But ideology matters when it aligns with action. Iran’s language toward Israel has not been confined to diplomatic criticism. It has often portrayed Israel as an illegitimate entity to be erased, not simply opposed.[8] Standing alone, rhetoric is insufficient. Combined with long-term military buildup, proxy warfare, and direct attacks, rhetoric becomes evidence of intent.

That is a crucial difference.

The Proxy War Problem: Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, and Beyond

Those who try to isolate Iran from the behavior of its regional proxies often do so by drawing overly neat legal boxes around a very messy strategic reality. It is true that international law draws distinctions between funding, arming, directing, controlling, and fully attributing the acts of nonstate actors to a state. That matters legally. But strategy is not experienced in neat compartments.

Iran has, for years, supported Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthis, and other armed actors across the region.[9] U.S. policy documents continue to describe Iran as the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism, and Treasury sanctions have documented networks linked to the IRGC-Qods Force and associated militant financing structures.[10] Congressional Research Service reporting likewise treats proxy support as one of the principal instruments of Iranian power projection.[11]

This matters because the threat picture is cumulative. Israel does not experience Hezbollah rockets in the north, Hamas terrorism in the south, Houthi maritime attacks, and Iranian missile development as unrelated events. Nor does the United States experience attacks on regional bases, maritime threats, and proxy destabilization as disconnected accidents. They are part of a broader architecture of coercion.

To say that is not to erase legal complexity. It is simply to refuse strategic naivety.

Direct Iranian Attacks Changed the Equation

The most critical point in this entire discussion is that Iran is no longer merely accused of acting through proxies. It has already demonstrated its willingness to strike Israel directly. The White House stated in February 2025 that Iran had, since April 2024, twice shown its willingness to launch ballistic and cruise missile attacks against Israel.[12]

That fact matters enormously.

Once a state has already conducted direct missile attacks, the legal analysis changes. The argument is no longer about whether the state might someday become dangerous. The issue becomes whether the pattern of attack, escalation, and demonstrated capacity creates a continued or recurring threat sufficient to justify self-defense measures designed to stop the next blow rather than merely mourning the last one.[13]

This is precisely where the case for imminent danger becomes stronger. A threat is more credible when it has already been acted. A regime is more dangerous when it has already crossed the line from rhetoric to missiles.

The Nuclear Dimension: Grave Concern, But Not Simplistic Conclusions

The nuclear issue must be managed with precision. This is not the place for sensationalism. It is also not the place for denial.

The International Atomic Energy Agency reported in February 2026 that Iran’s declared stockpile included 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent U-235, while also warning that the Agency’s lack of access for more than eight months had become a serious matter of proliferation concern.[14] The IAEA further stated that it could not verify whether Iran had suspended all enrichment-related activities, could not verify the size of uranium stockpiles at affected locations, and could not conclude that no diversion of declared nuclear material had taken place.[15]

Those facts are serious. They establish that concern over Iran’s nuclear program is neither imaginary nor merely ideological. The matter is real, advanced, and clouded by a troubling degree of opacity.

At the same time, fairness requires clarity: the public record does not automatically prove that Iran possessed a fully assembled nuclear weapon ready for immediate use. That is an important distinction. The case of imminent danger cannot be made responsibly by exaggeration.[16]

The stronger argument is not that Iran had already crossed every possible threshold. The stronger argument is that the convergence of nuclear advancement, degraded verification, direct attacks, proxy warfare, and declared hostility sharply reduces the prudential room for waiting.

Why the Classical Definition of Imminence Is Under Pressure

One of the deepest problems in international law is that many of its classical formulations emerged in an era of slower mobilization, visible troop concentrations, and clearer timelines. Modern threats do not always mature that neatly. Ballistic missiles shorten warning windows. Proxy networks obscure attribution. Nuclear programs advance behind restricted inspections and partial transparency.

That does not mean the law is obsolete. It means the concept of imminence must be applied with intelligence rather than ritualism.

A state facing armored divisions massing at its border in the nineteenth century and a state facing a networked missile-proxy-nuclear threat in the twenty-first century are not facing identical strategic realities. If the doctrine of imminence is interpreted so narrowly that it only becomes relevant after catastrophic harm is unavoidable, then the doctrine has lost its purpose.[17]

That is one reason some governments, including the United States, have argued that where armed attacks have already occurred and further attacks are reasonably expected, a separate showing of imminence should not always be interpreted in the most rigid temporal sense, so long as the response remains necessary and proportionate.[18]

The Best Case for Imminent Danger in the Iran Context

If one is to argue seriously that Iran presents an imminent danger to Israel, and under some circumstances to the United States, that argument should rest on a cumulative framework.

1. Demonstrable hostile intent

Iran’s ideological and rhetorical posture toward Israel has long been eliminationist rather than merely adversarial.[19]

2. Proven military capability

Iran possesses substantial missile capability and has already shown willingness to use it directly against Israel.[20]

3. Operational proxy infrastructure

Iran has built and sustained a regional network of armed actors capable of pressuring Israel, threatening U.S. forces, destabilizing governments, and disrupting international shipping.[21]

4. Nuclear advancement under degraded verification

The IAEA’s findings demonstrate serious nuclear concerns compounded by reduced transparency and weakened monitoring.[22]

5. Repeated patterns of attack and escalation

This is not a theoretical future risk alone. It is a threat environment already marked by actual attacks, regional escalation, and persistent coercive pressure.[23]

Taken together, these elements make the argument for imminent danger more than plausible. They do not prove that every military operation against Iran is lawful. They do establish that the issue cannot be honestly dismissed as mere fearmongering or war propaganda.

The Fair Counterargument: The Risk of Sliding into Preventive War

A serious article must also state the best objection.

Critics argue that even grave hostility, serious nuclear concern, and repeated regional violence do not automatically satisfy the classical threshold of imminence. They warn that once states are allowed to say, “the danger is growing and time is running out,” the law can quickly slide from anticipatory self-defense into preventive war.[24]

That is not an unserious concern. It is a necessary caution.

The danger of abuse is real. If imminence is defined too loosely, then every major power can claim the right to attack its rivals before those rivals become too difficult to deter. That would hollow out the prohibition on the use of force and turn strategic anxiety into a universal doctrine of unilateral war.[25]

So yes, the doctrine must remain narrow. Yes, the evidence must be concrete. Yes, necessity and proportionality must still govern.

But acknowledging those risks does not erase the force of the Iran case. It simply means that the case must be argued with rigor rather than passion alone.

The United States and the Doctrine of Collective Self-Defense

The United States enters this matter not only as Israel’s ally, but also as a state with its own regional interests, forces, bases, and strategic responsibilities. Article 51 preserves the inherent rights of collective self-defense and individual self-defense.[26]

That matters because the relevant question is not only whether Israel is threatened. The question is whether Iranian actions also threaten U.S. personnel, bases, maritime routes, and regional stability in ways that create an independent American interest in intervention.

Congressional Research Service reporting in March 2026 noted continued Iranian retaliatory attacks involving Israel, bases hosting U.S. forces, Gulf targets, and adjacent waters, with U.S. personnel reportedly among the casualties.[27] In that environment, Washington can frame military action not merely as alliance politics, but as a combination of collective self-defense, force protection, and regional security maintenance.

That does not end the legal debate. But it does strengthen the American case.

The Security Council Problem: Law, Power, and Paralysis of the Veto

One of the most frustrating realities in the law of intervention is that the collective security system is often least effective when the stakes are highest. Under the U.N. Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for international peace and security, and its permanent members retain veto power over substantive resolutions.[28]

This creates a structural problem. If a conflict implicates a proxy, client, or strategic interest of one of the five permanent, decisive authorization may become unattainable. In such situations, the legal framework remains in place, but the political machinery for enforcement or authorization is paralyzed.

That does not mean international law is meaningless. Nor does it mean the U.N. created the entirety of the law governing force. But it does mean that threatened states often face a bitter reality: the institution most associated with international peace may be unable to act precisely because great-power rivalry blocks it.[29]

That is one reason self-defense doctrines continue to matter so deeply. When collective security fails, states revert to inherent defense arguments. The danger, of course, is that such arguments can be used too broadly. The necessity, however, is equally real.

A Fair Conclusion: The Danger Is Real; the Doctrine Must Remain Disciplined

The fairest conclusion is not simplistic. Iran is not merely a state that says offensive things. Nor is it automatically a blank-check justification for every military operation conducted in its direction.

The evidence supports a serious argument that Iran can constitute an imminent danger to Israel, and under some circumstances to the United States as well. That case is grounded in declared hostility, proxy warfare, direct missile attacks, advanced nuclear activity, reduced verification, and a pattern of escalation that narrows the margin for complacency.[30]

At the same time, the doctrine of imminent danger must remain disciplined. It is strongest when tied to necessity, proportionality, credible evidence, and a concrete threat environment. It weakens when it becomes a rhetorical substitute for proof.

That is the real challenge for analysts, policymakers, and statesmen. The task is neither to romanticize restraint nor to glorify force. It is to distinguish between danger that is real but manageable, and danger that has matured to the point where waiting is no longer wisdom, but negligence.

In the case of Iran, Israel, and the United States, this is not a trivial distinction. It may be the distinction on which the next phase of regional security turns.

Notes

[1] U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 51.

[2] The Caroline formula remains central to discussions of anticipatory self-defense. See also the U.N. Repertory in Article 51.

[3] U.N. Charter art. 51.

[4] U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 51.

[5] U.N. Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Article 51.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, arts. 11, 152, 154. This article relies on the commonly cited English translation used in legal discussion.

[8] Public reporting has repeatedly documented eliminationist rhetoric by Iran’s leadership toward Israel.

[9] The White House, NSPM-2, describes Iran-backed terrorist and militant groups across the region.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Congressional Research Service reporting has consistently described proxy support as central to Iranian regional policy.

[12] The White House, NSPM-2.

[13] U.N. Charter art. 51; U.N. Repertory, Article 51.

[14] International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2026/8, at sections F and G.

[15] Ibid.

[16] IAEA, GOV/2026/8.

[17] U.N. Repertory, Article 51.

[18] See U.S. official arguments in recent self-defense discussions; compare with Article 51’s preserved inherent right.

[19] Iran’s constitutional and ideological posture is part of the broader evidentiary context.

[20] The White House, NSPM-2.

[21] The White House, NSPM-2; related U.S. policy materials.

[22] IAEA, GOV/2026/8.

[23] The White House, NSPM-2; Israel MFA, Operation “Rising Lion.”

[24] This is the central critique advanced by narrower readings of Article 51 and by opponents of expansive anticipatory self-defense theories.

[25] U.N. Charter art. 2(4).

[26] U.N. Charter art. 51.

[27] Recent CRS reporting has described Iranian retaliatory attacks affecting Israel, Gulf targets, and bases hosting U.S. forces.

[28] Charter arts. 27, 39 to 42.

[29] Ibid.

[30] The White House, NSPM-2; IAEA, GOV/2026/8; Israel MFA, Operation “Rising Lion.”

References

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2026, February 27). NPT safeguards agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2026/8).

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2025, August 12 update). Operation “Rising Lion”: Key factual and legal aspects of the Iran-Israel hostilities, June 13 to 24, 2025.

The White House. (2025, February 4). National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-2.

The White House. (2025, February 4). Fact sheet: President Donald J. Trump restores maximum pressure on Iran.

United Nations. (1945). Charter of the United Nations.

United Nations. Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Article 51.